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Thirteen years ago the US invaded Iraq and brought down the brutal dictatorship 
of Saddam Hussein. While Iraqis have many grievances with the new political elite, 
pervasive corruption has been a primary focus of public dissatisfaction. Corruption 
in Iraq is not a new phenomenon; however, since the 2003 US invasion, it has 
grown in magnitude and has become much more pronounced. The purpose of this 
thesis is to provide an understanding of corruption in Iraq by drawing on literatures 
from various academic fields. This work demonstrates that throughout modern 
Iraqi history the desire to maintain political power has encouraged the use of 
corrupt practices. Political regimes have been able to consolidate power by 
appropriating Iraq’s oil wealth to the detriment of state development. This work 
also highlights the need to broaden the current understanding of corruption in Iraq 
in order to effectively resolve the problem. Overall, this research can be used to 





Thirteen years ago the US invaded Iraq and brought down the brutal 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and nostalgia for the infamous tyrant grows every 
day. Voices across the spectrum of Iraq’s diverse society can be heard expressing 
the desire for the return of Saddam.1 It is remarkable to think that, for some Iraqis, 
living under an oppressive dictatorship is preferable to the current government. 
While Iraqis have many grievances with the new political elite, pervasive 
corruption has been a primary focus of public dissatisfaction. Since the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s public sector has consistently ranked among the most 
corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The most recent Corruption Perception Index 
prepared for 2014 ranks Iraq 170 out of 175 countries.2  
In the years after the US invasion, Iraq’s political system radically 
transformed into a representative democracy. To ensure inclusivity, the US 
installed a power sharing arrangement to guarantee that all major segments of 
Iraqi society would have a stake in the political system. While inclusivity is 
                                                          
1 Abu Zeed, Adnan. "Were Iraqis Really Better off under Saddam?" Al-Monitor. February 26, 2016. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/iraq-miss-saddam-hussein-rule.html#.  




important in a society as diverse as Iraq, this political system has contributed to the 
rising levels of corruption in the country. This political arrangement has guaranteed 
that the central administrative power is distributed among Sunnis, Shias, and 
Kurds, but this has not meant that politicians have been working towards the 
interests of their respective communities. The power sharing system has led to the 
personalization of public offices and reinforced patterns of patronage, clientelism, 
and nepotism that have been historically prevalent throughout Iraqi history. 
While corruption has been an ongoing issue in the modern Iraqi state, it has 
received little attention in academic literature. The purpose of this thesis is to 
provide a much needed understanding of corruption in Iraq. In order to accomplish 
this I raise three interrelated questions: What can explain the extent of corruption 
in Iraq? How has corruption affected development? And what role has the 
international community played in addressing corruption in Iraq, and how can 
these policies be improved? The following three chapters address these questions 
by drawing on literatures from various academic fields. The multidisciplinary 
nature of this work will provide a well-rounded understanding of corruption in Iraq. 
The first chapter seeks to explain the extent of corruption in Iraq. It begins 
by offering a general theoretical framework of corruption. Examining Iraq through 
this framework reveals that the desire for power drives the political elite to use 
3 
 
corrupt patrimonial practices, including patronage, clientelism, and nepotism. 
While patrimonialism has been a regular feature of every governing regime in Iraq, 
the corruption that stems from these patrimonial practices seems to have grown in 
magnitude under the current political elite. 
The second chapter of this work shifts to examine corruption’s impact on 
development. It specifically focuses on the corrupting influence of Iraq’s natural 
resource wealth. Throughout Iraqi history, oil rents have reinforced the corrupt 
practices of the political elite. Political survival has, in part, depended on the 
appropriation of Iraq’s oil wealth, which has been used to create and maintain 
loyal networks of support. This practice has diverted resources to unproductive 
activities and limited the ability of the government to address important 
development issues, including education, health, and poor infrastructure.  
The last chapter examines the good governance initiatives that have been 
an important feature of the anti-corruption frameworks of international 
organizations. These initiatives have played a prominent role in international 
organizations’ strategy for combating corruption in Iraq. A number of initiatives 
have been used to increase transparency and accountability and improve anti-
corruption institutions capabilities, yet they have not been effective at combating 
corruption. A more effective approach will require international organizations to 
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widen their views on how Iraq can overcome the significant barriers to the fight 
against corruption.  
 Overall, this work will demonstrate why corruption has persisted over time 
in Iraq. It will also demonstrate the difficulties Iraq will face in combating 
corruption given its historical persistence. This study will also point to a broader 
issue with Iraq’s current political system. The power sharing system installed by the 
US after the overthrow of Saddam is largely seen by Iraqis as the root cause of 
corruption in the country and this is demonstrated by ongoing protests and 
persistent calls for a new political system. Given rising public dissatisfaction, a 
more efficient political system that satisfies the needs of every community will be 
important for Iraq moving forward. This work concludes by examining the 
limitations of the study and the possibilities for future research.   
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Corruption in Modern Iraq  
Corruption in Iraq is not a new phenomenon; however, since the 2003 US 
invasion, it has grown in magnitude and has become much more pronounced. One 
Iraqi aptly described corruption in Iraq like God – omnipresent, you cannot prove 
nor can you deny its existence.3 Corruption is a failure that keeps the government 
from functioning properly. Frustrations reached a peak in summer 2015 as 
thousands of Iraqis took to the streets to protest the endemic corruption that has 
undermined the government’s ability to provide basic services to the Iraqi people.4 
This chapter will attempt to identify the underlying reasons behind the extent of 
corruption in Iraq. To gain a better understanding of corruption, we must examine 
its historical root causes. In doing so, we find that patrimonial practices and neo-
patrimonial governance models have been utilized throughout the history of the 
modern Iraqi state as a method to consolidate power. This form of governance has 
relied on clientelism, nepotism, and patronage to maintain personal networks of 
loyalty that have undoubtedly contributed to the level of corruption in the country. 
Corruption in Iraq today can be seen as a continuation of old policies that are 
                                                          
3 Abdul-Ahad, Gaith. "'More Dangerous than Isis': Power Cuts Leave Iraqis Boiling with Rage." The 
Guardian. October 5, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/iraq-power-cuts-isis-
corruption-electricity?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.  




designed to establish and strengthen a system of patronage and favoritism 
ensuring loyalty and regime continuity.5 
Theory of Corruption 
Patrimonialism is an idea that has been developed extensively by Max 
Weber. According to Weber, three types of legitimate authority exist: legal-
rational, traditional, and charismatic.6 For the purposes of this work I am only 
concerned with the legal-rational and traditional types of authority. Legal-rational 
authority is a system grounded in law and bureaucratic administration, typically a 
characteristic of modern societies. Authority rests on the acceptance of the legality 
of rules and the right that people in elected positions of authority have to make 
these rules. The bureaucratic administration is hierarchical and positions of 
authority within the administration are based on merit rather than personal 
connections. Perhaps the most important characteristic is the requirement that 
“members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from 
ownership of the means of production or administration.”7 This public-private 
                                                          
5 Ghanim, David. Iraq's Dysfunctional Democracy. (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2011), 226. 
6 Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, (California: University of California Press, 2013), 215. 
7 Ibid., 218-219 
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distinction will be important to the understanding why corruption occurs in 
modern states.  
In contrast the traditional type of authority is derived from the idea of 
patriarchalism and is characteristic of pre-modern societies. Weber argued that 
societies relying on traditional forms of authority rooted it in the sanctity of 
traditional positions and in established customs (particularly rules of inheritance) 
rather than in modern bureaucratic structures. The ability of an authority figure to 
dominate not only comes from tradition, but also from the willingness of those 
around him since he does not possess the capabilities to enforce his rule 
otherwise. Patrimonialism evolved from the idea of patriarchalism. Weber wrote 
that, “Previously the master’s authority appeared as a pre-eminent group right, 
now it turns into his personal right, which he appropriates in the same way as he 
would any ordinary object of possession.”8 The state is appropriated by the ruler 
and his entourage and the personal networks that infiltrate the state apparatus 
allow him to control the state and extract resources to maintain his own 
networks.9 The economic means of the state, state administration, and military are 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 232 
9 Médard, J.-F., “Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism and the Study of the Post-colonial state in 
Subsaharan Africa”, in Improved Natural Resource Management — the Role of Formal Organisations 
and Informal Networks and Institutions. Institute of International Development Studies, Roskilde 
University, Roskilde (1996): 76-97.  
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all seized for personal use.10 Unlike the legal-rational state system, the line 
between public and private is blurred given that state resources are used as a 
means to exert power. Authority figures also typically exert control through kin 
ties, patron-client relationships, and personal allegiances.11 At the heart of 
patrimonial power is clientelism and patronage, but can often include tribalism and 
nepotism as mechanisms of economic and political control.12 
As countries modernized in the Weberian sense, adopting the qualities 
found in legal-rational bureaucracies, scholars wanted to understand how states 
could be modern, yet exhibit the patrimonial characteristics of pre-modern states. 
In the 1960s Guenther Roth put forward the notion that these new states could be 
understood through modern patrimonialism.13 A decade later, expanding on Roth’s 
work, Shmuel Eisenstadt coined the term neo-patrimonialism to offer an 
explanation of the governing models in newly modernized societies in the Middle 
East, Latin America, and South East Asia. Eisenstadt recognized that post-
traditional nation states or neo-patrimonial regimes developed differently from the 
                                                          
10 Achcar, Gilbert, and G. M. Goshgarian. The People Want a Radical Exploration of the Arab 
Uprising. 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 58. 
11 Charrad, Mounira and Julia Adams. 2011. “Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present”.Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636. (Sage Publications, 2011), 7. 
12 Médard, J.-F., Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, 88. 
13 Roth, Guenther. "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States." 
World Politics 20, no. 2 (1968): 194-206.  
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nation state or revolutionary models of modernity.14 Neo-patrimonial societies can 
best be understood as “societies that have felt the impact of modern states and 
have been incorporated into the modern international system differentiating them 
from patrimonial societies.”15 Exchanges that once took place within traditional 
patrimonial practices are now conducted through and within the modern 
apparatus of the state.16 In neo-patrimonial states patrimonial practices hide 
behind the façade of the typical qualities of modern states. Despite these modern 
qualities, neo-patrimonial states utilize the same practices of kin ties, patron-client 
networks, and personal allegiances that one may observe in pre-modern societies. 
This distinction between patrimonial and neo-patrimonial allows us to avoid the 
errors of a-historicity, as traditional societies of the past are not comparable to 
modern societies today.17 
Corruption can generally be defined as “the abuse of public office for 
private gain.”18 This underlies the Weberian legal-rational distinction between 
                                                          
14 Eisenstadt, S. N. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. (Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publications, 1973), 13. 
15 Clapham, Christopher S. Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern 
State. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 179. 
16 Herring, Eric, and Glen Rangwala. Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy. (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2011), 128. 
17 Médard, J.-F., Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, 83. 
18 "Corruption and Economic Development." Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the 




public and private spheres. Therefore, one way to understand how patrimonial 
practices can lead to corruption in modern state systems is by examining the 
differences between Weber’s authority types. Weber did not explicitly write about 
corruption in modern states; however, an understanding of corruption can be 
inferred by examining the differences between the characteristics of legal-rational 
and traditional states.19 Modern state systems today are considered to be legal-
rational since rule is impersonal, follows a legitimate legal code, and most 
importantly, public officials do not use state resources for their own personal gain. 
On the other hand, neo-patrimonial states do not necessarily make the same 
distinction between public and private given the personalization of public 
resources. It is important to note that values of traditional patrimonialism do not 
necessarily constitute corruption since this distinction would never arise. A 
patrimonial ruler does not see the personal use of public resources as corruption 
because he legitimately believes that he has a personal right to these resources. 
However, in terms of neo-patrimonialism it “becomes corruption when the 
distinction between what is private and what is public is recognized but not 
                                                          
19 Graaf, Gjalt De., Patrick Von. Maravić, and Pieter Wagenaar. The Good Cause: Theoretical 
Perspectives on Corruption. (Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 2010), 21. 
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respected.”20 It is not possible for a neo-patrimonial state to brush aside the 
concept of corruption since it is built in the principles of a legal-rational state.  
While patrimonial practices within a legal-rational or modern state system 
may lead to corruption, it is important to note that, in terms of Middle Eastern 
societies, these practices were not always deemed to be corrupt seeing as they 
previously served a function in society. Patrimonial practices should have 
disintegrated once modern nation states began to form in the region, however, 
these traditional practices continued on to infiltrate the framework of the modern 
nation state. These practices are considered unacceptable or corrupt in terms of 
Western notions of modernity within a legal-rational framework.  
Many tribal qualities of Middle Eastern societies may lead to corruption 
when certain tribal practices are used within the modern state framework. Before 
the creation of modern states tribes provided structure to society. Tribes were 
seen as “a self-contained social organization based on lineage and imbued with 
autonomy, having social, economic, political, military and cultural functions.”21 One 
of the practices used within tribal groups to maintain unity was wasta. Wasta 
                                                          
20 Médard, J.-F., Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, 89. 
21 Jabar, Faleh. "Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998." In Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in 
the Middle East. (London: Saqi, 2003), 72. 
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translates to “the middle” and was used as a means of mediation between clans 
within tribes and between other tribes.22 The wasta evolved over time from a tool 
for mediation into an intercessory practice. “Intercessory wasta is a process in 
which a broker uses structural power as a gatekeeper to provide access to 
resources unattainable to the other party.”23 The intercessory wasta is the modern 
face of the traditional wasta becoming the prominent way to seek benefits from 
the government.24  While wasta served a legitimate mediating function in tribal 
societies, as it evolved in a modern setting this practice is viewed as corrupt since 
favoritism rather than merit exists at its core. In a modern society services and 
employment positions are not necessarily determined by merit, but by personal 
connections. For those that do not benefit from wasta it can certainly be seen as a 
source of nepotism and cronyism because of the personal nature of the practice.  
Further, the use of patron-client relationships has been entrenched in 
Middle Eastern societies for centuries, “particularly during the Ottoman period 
where intermediaries (a’yan) helped facilitate links between public (al-‘amma), or 
                                                          
22 Barnett, Andy, Bruce Yandle, and George Naufal. "Regulation, Trust, and Cronyism in Middle 
Eastern Societies: The Simple Economics of “Wasta”." (The Journal of Socio-Economics 44, 2013), 
43.  
23 "’Wasta’: Traidic Trust in Jordanian Business." In The Political Economy of Wasta: Use and Abuse 
of Social Capital Networking, edited by M. A. Ramady, by David Weir, David Bamber, and Thomas 
Brandstaetter. (Springer, 2016), 73. 
24 Al-Ramahi, Aseel. “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit For) Middle Eastern 
Society” (Arab Law Quarterly 22, no. 1, 2008), 37. 
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clients, and political patrons (al-khassa).”25 During the Ottoman period patron-
client networks represented a stabilizing force in the absence of formal 
mechanisms and institutions that ensured government control over the 
population.26 It was not necessarily seen as corrupt, but served a purpose to bring 
order to the vast stretches of the Ottoman Empire. This practice was not limited to 
the Arab world under the Ottoman Empire, but could also be observed in Iran 
under the Safavid and Qajar dynasties.27 This traditional practice carried over into 
the modern state system where it is considered corrupt because state resources 
are used to maintain informal networks of political participation.  While these are 
just a few of the patrimonial practices that have found their way into the modern 
state system, they illustrate that these practices once served legitimate functions 
that were not necessarily considered corrupt. 
Neo-patrimonialism in Iraq 
Patrimonial practices have been incorporated into governance since the 
inception of the modern Iraqi state. Charles Tripp identifies the resilience of 
patrimonialism as one of the dominant narratives of the state.28 The use of patron-
                                                          
25 MacQueen, Benjamin. An Introduction to Middle East Politics: Continuity, Change, Conflict and Co-
Operation. (London: Sage, 2013), 181 
26 Denoeux, Guilain. Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in 
Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 36 
27 Ibid., 38. 
28 Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5-6.  
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client networks throughout society have particularly played an important role in 
Iraq’s political history and has been a way of ensuring what Tripp calls narrative 
consistency. As Iraq grew rich from oil, it was easier to maintain corrupt 
patrimonial practices. Oil income reinforced these practices to ensure the majority 
of the Iraqi population was dependent on the minority at the center of power.29 
The appropriation of state resources to reinforce patrimonial practices has 
continued to be a vital part of consolidating power among Iraq’s current political 
elite.  
Patrimonial practices were introduced into the modern Iraqi state under 
King Faisal’s reign. It was important for King Faisal to build a support base among 
the Iraqi people seeing as he was considered an outsider and a puppet of the 
British administration. He was able to use various forms of patronage to co-opt 
important individuals, including tribal sheikhs, Kurdish chieftains, and Shia 
mujtahids, into the reward system of the Iraqi state.30 In doing so King Faisal set 
the precedent for those that would come after to utilize similar patrimonial 
practices to garner the support necessary to maintain power.   
                                                          
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., 51. 
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Attempts to gain full control of the state through patrimonial practices, 
such as clientelism and patronage, were not entirely effective, however, given the 
political volatility that persisted until 1968. This political instability and struggle for 
power in Iraq is demonstrated by numerous coups, most notably the 14 July 
Revolution in 1958 resulting in the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy and the 
17 July Revolution in 1968 that ushered in thirty five years of Ba’ath party rule. The 
Ba’ath regime was able to end this cycle of instability by creating an enduring neo-
patrimonial state based on patrimonial practices, including patronage and 
clientelism. The Ba’ath regime used the same types of patrimonial practices used 
by previous regimes, however, they were able to utilize them in more effective 
ways.31   
The Ba’ath party understood its predecessor’s pitfalls and even their own 
after the bloodless coup that removed them from power in November 1963. Past 
events made them determined to avoid the same mistakes. In the words of 
Saddam: “We cannot allow some three or four officers riding on tanks to come and 
take power again.”32 Completely aware of the vicious cycle of coups, the engineers 
                                                          
31 While the focus of this work is on the use of corrupt patrimonial practices, the use of fear and 
violence was also important to the Ba’ath regime’s survival. The use of repressive tactics is outside 
the scope of this study; however, it should not be overlooked when determining how the Ba’ath 
regime was able to effectively consolidate power.  
32 Jabar, Faleh. Sheikhs and Ideologues, 81.  
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of the 1968 coup created a lasting regime that differed from past forms of rule. The 
tribal background of the main figures of the 1968 coup was key to informing their 
views on how they would cling to power. Three of the five founding members of 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the governing body of the Ba’ath party, 
came from the Albu Nasir tribe in Tikrit.33 In their search for a way to remedy their 
past mistakes they found that they could exploit traditional tribal solidarity to 
create a loyal regime that would allow them to consolidate power.34 It was Khayr 
Allah Talfah, Saddam’s uncle, who suggested to President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr 
that he needed to rely on family ties to cement his grip on power, arguing that the 
Ba’ath party’s past experiences proved that party loyalty would not be enough to 
do so.35 Though ‘Abd Al-Salam ‘Arif had also incorporated his relatives and kin to 
consolidate power after the 1963 coup,36 this time the Ba’athists perfected this 
tactic by incorporating tribe and clan more heavily within the regime’s structure. 
Ba’ath leaders integrated members of the Albu Nasir tribe into key positions of the 
institutions of state control, including the military and security services, knowing 
that they would adhere to the traditional tribal values of loyalty and honor. While 
                                                          
33 Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. 2nd ed. (New York: Westview Press, 2004), 104. 
34 Jabar, Faleh. Sheikhs and Ideologues, 80.  
35 Dodge, Toby, and Steven Simon, eds. Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of 
Regime Change. (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 95. 
36 Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. Iraq since 1958 from Revolution to Dictatorship. (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1990), 219.  
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Ba’athists used traditional tribal relationships to ensure solidarity and cohesion, 
the nature of the relationship transformed into a bureaucratic/clientele system 
due to newly incorporated service-money relations.37 If somehow tribal solidarity 
would not be enough to maintain loyalty, the provision of economic and political 
power would certainly be enough to buy their loyalty.  
Under Saddam Hussein’s regime tribal and clan patronage would continue 
to be important as he developed additional solidarity networks. Saddam 
incorporated other Tikriti tribes and tribes of the Sunni triangle as second and third 
circles of protection.38 The loyalty of various Tikriti tribes were important for 
Saddam’s security and political dominance. Members of several Tikriti tribes filled 
sensitive positions within the armed forces, Republican Guard, and internal 
security. While Tikritis were prominent within the armed forces and internal 
security, they were less visible within the hierarchy of the Ba’ath party, especially 
the lower levels of the party. The regime allowed Shia members to dominate the 
lower and middle levels to give them a sense of participation in running the party, 
while key positions at the upper levels were dominated by Tikritis.39  
                                                          
37 Jabar, Faleh. Sheikhs and Ideologues, 82. 
38 Dawood, Hosham. "The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of 
Iraq." In Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East. (London: Saqi, 2003), 121.  
39 Dodge and Simon, eds. Iraq at the Crossroads, 105. 
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In terms of the tribes from the Sunni triangle, their relationship under the 
Ba’ath and Saddam was a volatile one. These tribes experienced shifting policies, 
from marginalization to integration to eradication.40 After initial Ba’ath opposition 
to tribes, announcing rejection of tribalism as remnants of colonialism,41 Saddam 
found it politically convenient to manipulate the regime’s relationship with these 
tribes. During the 1980s, Saddam bought the loyalty of tribal elders and sheikhs by 
providing services, money, and goods in exchange for their help with recruiting 
men to fight the Iran-Iraq war.42 By the 1990s, the strategy of courting Sunni tribes 
created increasingly serious costs for the regime. Not only did intertribal conflict 
increase, as they received powerful artillery through the regime,43 but tribally-
organized coups were attempted by Republican Guard officers from the Dulaymi, 
Ubyadi, and Jiburi tribes.44 As tribes grew to be a threat to Saddam, he cracked 
down on them to force subservience.  
While family, clan, and tribal loyalty were important for Saddam’s 
consolidation of power, over time he incorporated nearly every community in Iraq 
                                                          
40 Charrad, Mounira. “Central and Local Patrimonialism: State-building in Kin-based Societies” 
(Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636. 2011), 61-64. 
41 Baram, Amatzia. “Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96” (International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 29  no.1, 1997), 1. 
42 Hashim, Ahmed. “Saddam Husayn and Civil-military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy 
and Power” (Middle East Journal 57, no. 1, 2003), 31. 
43 Charrad, Mounira. 2011. Central and Local Patrimonialism, 64. 
44 Hashim, Ahmed. 2003. Saddam Husayn and Civil-military Relations in Iraq, 32. 
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into his network of patronage, including Shias and Kurds. Patronage was not 
exclusively limited to the Sunni Arab north-west, but large numbers of people from 
different communities were rewarded with positions of influence, special access to 
housing, and material resources in exchange for their loyalty.45 The network of 
clients also extended beyond those who joined the Ba’ath party to include even 
those outside of the party as long as they continued to support Saddam’s regime. 
Through an examination of an archive of government documents, Joseph Sassoon 
uncovers the different rewards system that co-opted a large portion of the Iraqi 
population.46 Sassoon highlights the hierarchical nature of the rewards system 
where different medals and badges corresponded with certain privileges. The more 
medals or badges a person had the higher the rewards, which included money, 
land, jobs, and pensions. 
Inherited Corruption 
Iraq, in its current state, represents a classic example of a neo-patrimonial 
regime. While some have claimed that its evolution from patrimonial to neo-
patrimonial took place after the 2003 US invasion,47 it can be argued that it has 
                                                          
45 Tripp. A History of Iraq, 226. 
46 Sassoon, Joseph. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 206. 
47 Achcar and Goshgarian. The People Want, 59. 
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always been neo-patrimonial given that patrimonial practices have been 
incorporated into the modern Iraqi state system since its creation in order to 
consolidate power. After the overthrow of Saddam, the new political elite 
continued to use the same practices historically used to maintain power. 
Nepotism, favoritism, patronage, and clientelism have persisted as tools to 
consolidate power for virtually every political party operating in Iraq. While these 
practices have been used by governments throughout Iraqi history, the extent of 
corruption in Iraq today has reached unprecedented levels, leading some to claim 
that corruption has worsened post-Saddam.48 However, this legacy of pervasive 
corruption, though a recent creation, is largely seen to have been inherited by the 
new regime in Iraq.49  
It is important to note, that while corruption was inherited by the new 
regime, corruption under Saddam only intensified and became more pronounced 
after the effects of two devastating wars and economic sanctions. Saddam did 
appropriate state resources, which given the framework of corruption presented in 
this chapter, still represents a corrupt act. However, perceptions of corruption 
were low during the early years of the Ba’ath regime, which is attributed to 
                                                          
48 Anwar, Omar. "Iraq: Anti-Corruption Head Gets Tough on Officials." CorpWatch. March 5, 2005.  
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12064.  
49 Ghanim, David. In Iraq's Dysfunctional Democracy, 214. 
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Saddam’s commitment to development and high living standards. The Ba’athist 
government was constantly involved in construction and infrastructure projects 
that provided employment and increased standards of living to justify its rule.50 
During this time, perceptions of corruption in Iraq were low since increased living 
standards worked to distract the public from the fact that Saddam was 
appropriating the state’s wealth. Also, under Saddam’s rule there were few 
instances of corruption in lower levels of government. Saddam’s regime 
“monopolized corruption and restricted access to wealth and power, thereby 
limiting opportunities for corruption.”51 The greatest deterrent from corruption, 
however, were Laws 8 and 52 which made receiving bribes or commissions 
punishable by death.52 Saddam made an example of two deputy ministers who 
were accused of taking bribes by publicizing their execution as a warning to those 
within and outside government.53  
Corruption in Iraq gradually became more pronounced after the state 
began to deteriorate from the effects of the Iran-Iraq war and more so after the 
Gulf war and burden of economic sanctions. Substantial effects on the Iraqi state 
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were felt four days into the Iran-Iraq war as Iran attacked Iraq’s oil facilities forcing 
output to decline from 3.4 MBD in August 1980 to .140 MBD just two months 
later.54 Revenue declined from $26.1 billion in 1980 to $10.4 billion in 1981, 
reducing the contribution of oil sector to gross national product (GNP) from two-
thirds in 1980 to only one-third in 1981.55 The destruction of the oil infrastructure 
reduced revenue from Iraq’s most important economic sector, forcing the 
government to adopt austerity programs and halt all development projects that 
were not related to the war. During this period, Iraq began to lose gains it had 
made in economic development in the previous decade. By the end of the war Iraq 
was $42 billion in debt to Arab and foreign countries, the Iraqi dinar was weak, and 
infrastructure was destroyed.56 Worst of all, oil prices were deteriorating from an 
average high of $32 per barrel in 1981 to an average of $12-$14 in 1988.57  
Desperate for a solution to Iraq’s economic crisis, Saddam Hussein made 
the decision to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which led to further destruction 
of the Iraqi economy. The rationale behind annexing Kuwait was that Iraq’s oil 
reserves would double, oil production quotas would increase from 3.1 MBD to 4.6 
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MBD, oil income would increase from $38 billion to $60 billion, debts would be 
paid off in five years, and most importantly Iraq would be able to increase 
spending on development projects and imports.58 However, this dream was cut 
short as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 was passed 
on the day of the invasion condemning Iraq’s actions and four days later UNSCR 
661 was passed imposing mandatory sanctions and embargo on Iraq. UNSCR 661 
would cause Iraq to plunge into a deeper economic crisis as it was completely 
dependent on the world market for oil exports, consumer goods, raw materials, 
foreign exchange earnings, import of food, and technology.59 The embargo shut off 
ninety percent of imports and ninety-seven percent of exports, costing the 
economy an estimated $17 billion in the six month period before the January 1991 
bombing of Iraq.60 The bombing of Iraq decimated not only military infrastructure, 
but civilian infrastructure, hospitals, transport and communication networks, 
industrial plants, oil facilities, and power stations.61 A special United Nations (UN) 
mission revealed that the conflict caused “…near-apocalyptic results upon the 
economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather high 
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urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have 
been destroyed or rendered tenuous.”62   
The UN sanctions extended over a period of thirteen years greatly 
damaging Iraqi society and the Iraqi economy. Sanctions precipitated a drastic 
decline in living standards and public services evident in increased poverty, 
malnutrition, infant mortality, and starvation. All sectors of society were affected. 
GDP plummeted, inflation and unemployment increased, and the Iraqi dinar 
collapsed.63  
Corruption began to flourish in Iraq during this desperate period, as Ghanim 
explains:  
Deteriorating living standards resulting in the decimation of the middle 
class gradually led to widespread corruption. This corruption was also 
motivated by a decline in the capacity of the state during the 1990s. 
During this time the regime itself became highly corrupt and turned into a 
mafia-style rule where the president, his family, and his relatives engaged 
in high profiteering from oil smuggling and a flourishing black market. As 
such, corruption became uncontrollable in light of an increasingly 
narrowing social base of the regime.64 
 
                                                          
62 United Nations Security Council. Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in 
Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Matti 
Ahtisaari, Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management. March 20, 1991, 5.  
63 For a detailed survey of sanction consequences on the Iraqi economy and human welfare, see 
Abbas Alnasrawi, "Sanctions and the Economy." In Iraq's Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and 
Underdevelopment, 93-116. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002.  
64 Ghanim, David. Iraq's Dysfunctional Democracy, 213. 
25 
 
Corruption took on a new form in 1996 when Iraq began to sell oil under the UN’s 
Oil for Food Programme. Iraq was allowed to sell enough oil to provide food and 
medicine that would alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by the sanctions. The 
regime, however, exploited the program to pocket billions in kickbacks and 
surcharges at the expense of the Iraqi people. “Illicit Iraqi income from surcharges 
on oil sales and kickbacks on humanitarian purchases would represent between 
$268 million and $7.5 billion according to different estimates.”65 This income not 
only served to consolidate patronage networks domestically, but functioned as a 
reward system internationally through oil vouchers provided as gifts, commissions 
for services, or in payment for goods to foreign companies and influential 
individuals to lobby for an end to sanctions and normalization of relations with 
Iraq.66 The corruption associated with patronage, clientelism, and nepotism 
intensified during this period and would spill over into post-Saddam Iraq. 
Post-conflict governing structures are often weak in terms of financial, 
fiscal, administrative and regulatory capacities which makes the state more prone 
to capture by privileged elites with access to power and resources.67 This was 
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precisely the case in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. The culture of corruption 
intensified with the substantial influx of aid and reconstruction money, and state 
building resources, coupled with the easing of international sanctions, weak 
oversight, poor management, and disorganized government.68  
Once the authoritarian control of power and resources by the Ba’ath was 
gone, greed and power struggles of the new political elite emerged to make power 
grabs taking as much money and assets as possible to boost power.69 To make 
matters worse, a muhasasa or power-sharing system was imposed on Iraq by the 
US occupation. The power-sharing system is meant to prevent conflict between 
Iraq’s diverse societies by giving everyone a stake in the political system; however, 
the problem with this system is that each political group treats awarded ministries 
as personal fiefdoms, “using it to skim money and to award ministerial positions to 
party loyalists and important constituents.”70 The old corrupt practices of past 
regimes were never challenged, instead they have been incorporated in Iraq’s new 
political system.  
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Patronage, clientelism, and nepotism are still very much a way for the elite 
to maintain power. The use of patronage and clientelism are tactics utilized 
throughout Iraq’s political system. In a way it is worse than it was under Saddam, 
since resource distribution is not through an individual or party, but many parties. 
All political parties use their access to state resources to create vast webs of 
patron-client networks. Parties actually compete for positions in the most resource 
rich state institutions, seizing resources for themselves and their support base. The 
benefits, jobs, and security provided by political parties in the absence of a 
properly functioning Iraqi state has made the reliance on these kinds of 
patrimonial relationships even more important. 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s eight year rule best exemplifies the 
continued use of corrupt patrimonial practices post-Saddam. Buying public loyalty 
and consolidating power and resources was an important part of Maliki’s rule. 
Much like Saddam, Maliki built personal relationships within important institutions 
to consolidate power. As head of Iraq’s government, he was able to create strong 
influences on security institutions, armed forces, independent institutions, and 
Iraq’s judiciary given that he had more resources and more complex networks of 
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patronage at his disposal.71  During the 2010 parliamentary election, Maliki’s 
coalition lost to Ayad Allawi’s bloc, prompting Maliki to demand a recount alleging 
fraud. He used his connections with his sister-in-law, Hamdiya al-Hussaini, at the 
Independent High Electoral Commission, the body tasked with supervising 
elections, to push for a recount. Also, much like Saddam, Maliki used state 
resources to buy the loyalty of the Iraqi public. During the 2014 elections, video 
surfaced of a member of parliament from Maliki’s State of the Law Coalition telling 
a group of farmers that he was sent by then Prime Minister Maliki to give them 
plots of land in exchange for their votes for his coalition.72 Maliki also routinely 
hired unqualified family members for positions within the government. After 
Maliki’s reelection in 2010, he appointed his son, Ahmad al-Maliki, as head of the 
prime minister’s office and his sons-in-law played prominent roles in the 
intelligence services.73   
Within Iraq’s public sector nepotism is also a common practice. There are 
countless cases of parliament members hiring family for government positions. For 
example, former vice president Tariq al-Hashimi’s office was run by his daughter 
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Rasha, who was assisted by his nephew and former speaker of parliament 
Mahmoud al-Mashhadani’s office was run by his sons and was known for 
promoting his wife’s political ambitions.74 Unqualified public sector employees are 
routinely hired on the basis of sectarian, political, and family ties. This practice 
began in 2003 with the US handover of Iraqi Ministries to the Iraqi Governing 
Council. Council members chose relatives to become ministers, which they in turn 
packed with party and personal affiliates.75 This practice repeats itself with every 
election as the prime minister assigns ministries to different politicians. As a result, 
ministries function as fiefdoms rather than true state institutions.76 Forged 
university degrees are purchased my most of the hires, since they are unqualified 
for government jobs. The Interior Ministry has admitted that some 9,000 forged 
university degrees have been purchased by prominent civil servants.77 An 
investigation by the Iraqi Integrity Commission and the Ministry of Justice also 
found some 20,000 to 50,000 government employees obtained their positions 
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using forged degrees.78 Unqualified and inexperienced staff have hampered the 
efficiency of the government and its ability to provide basic services to the public.  
While it may seem that corruption has become worse post-Saddam, it is 
difficult to prove with quantifiable evidence. This is due, in part, to the lack of data. 
For example, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index only 
provides scores for 2003-2014. Even if it did provide information for Saddam era 
corruption, the methodology used to measure perceptions of corruption will not 
allow for comparisons across time. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators provide data for perceptions of corruption from 1996-2014 and while 
this data is comparable across years, the 1990s was the most corrupt period under 
the Ba’ath regime. Using this information would not provide an accurate 
comparison as it would overstate Ba’ath era corruption. It is also difficult to gauge 
the cost of corruption to determine which regime was more corrupt.  There are no 
estimates for how much corruption has cost Iraq over the timespan of the Ba’ath 
regime. There are estimates for corruption during the period of economic 
sanctions, but they do not offer a clear picture as estimates vary from $268 million 
and $7.5 billion. In terms of the cost of corruption under the current political 
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regime, estimates range from $300 to $350 billion.79 While these estimates are 
important to understand the magnitude of corruption post-Saddam, without 
estimates of corruption under Ba’ath rule these numbers will not provide a helpful 
understanding of differences in corruption. Given the lack of quantifiable data, the 
best alternative to gauge the differences in corruption is through the anecdotal 
evidence provided above and throughout the remaining chapters.  
The extent to which corruption has spiraled out of control can best be 
illustrated by an interview with Iraqi politician Misha’an al-Juburi. Juburi confessed 
that, from top to bottom, the entire Iraqi political class is corrupt, including 
himself.80 He admitted that members of the Commission of Integrity, one of the 
independent bodies tasked with fighting corruption, routinely agree to close 
corruption files in exchange for bribes and shamelessly admits to have taken 
millions of dollars in bribes to do the same. He also admitted that, “If a child goes 
to bed hungry or if an Iraqi dies due to lack of medicine, it is because of the 
politicians in the Green Zone.”81 Juburi also observed that if the public knew how 
extensive corruption was they would burn the Green Zone to the ground. Despite, 
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his admissions Juburi is unlikely to be held accountable because he is protected by 
parliamentary immunity. An absolute majority in parliament could vote to strip him 
of his immunity; however, this is unlikely. If Juburi is prosecuted he will inevitably 
release the corruption files he holds on other politicians, creating a domino effect 
that could take down Iraq’s entire political class. The fact that a politician can 
publicly admit that the entire political system is corrupt without fear of 
repercussions demonstrates the extent of corruption in Iraq today.  
Conclusion 
Throughout the modern history of Iraq, corrupt patrimonial practices, 
including patronage, clientelism, and nepotism have been used as methods to 
consolidate power. State resources have been routinely appropriated by governing 
regimes in Iraq in order to support these practices. These methods were used 
during King Faisal’s reign in the early years of the Iraqi state and are still utilized as 
methods to maintain power in Iraq today. However, the corruption that stems 
from these practices seems to have grown in magnitude under the post-Saddam 
political elite. This can be attributed, in part, to the chaos that ensued after the 
2003 US invasion that made the state prone to state capture by the elites with 
access to power and resources. Political dynamics in Iraq also changed allowing for 
a larger political elite, which has led to competition for the state resources that 
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help maintain power. The resulting corruption in Iraq today can be seen as a 
continuation of the old corrupt practices of past regimes that are designed to 
















Political Survival and the Resource Curse 
Iraq is one of the least developed countries in the Middle East, despite having 
the world’s fifth largest oil reserves. The Human Development Index (HDI) can be 
used as an indicator to understand the extent of development.82 The HDI assesses 
development by incorporating proxies for three ends of development including, 
health, knowledge, and standard of living and is measured on a scale of 0 (low 
development) to 1 (high development). According to the 2015 HDI report, Iraq ranks 
121 out of 188 countries with a score of .654.83 Regionally Iraq performs poorly, 
ranking 15 out of 19 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. Iraq falls 
behind a number of resource poor countries, including Lebanon (.769), Jordan 
(.748), and Egypt (.690). According to the regional ranking, oil and gas rich countries, 
including Qatar (.850), Saudi Arabia (.837), United Arab Emirates (.835), Bahrain 
(.824), Kuwait (.816), and Oman (.793) all rank at the top of the regional HDI.84 It 
may be reasonable to assume that the abundance of natural resources in these Gulf 
countries helped foster high rates of development. Given Iraq’s abundance of oil it 
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seems that it should rank closer to the rest of the resource rich countries in MENA. 
A number of factors can explain the extent of development, including political 
corruption. It is the goal of this chapter to understand how corruption has 
contributed to slow development in Iraq. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
2003, an estimated $350 billion of government funds have disappeared due to 
corruption, making it a considerable obstacle for development and growth in Iraq.85 
One of the major corrupting influences in Iraq are oil rents. Throughout history Iraq’s 
oil wealth has reinforced the corrupt practice of patronage among its political class. 
This chapter focuses on the challenges to development posed by the resource curse, 
specifically through patronage. This corrupt practice has, in part, limited the ability 
of the government to address development issues, including poor infrastructure, 
education, and health. It is important to note, however, that many factors have 
contributed to the slowdown in development, including the consequences of three 
decades of war, economic sanctions, economic mismanagement, political conflict, 
and currently low oil prices and a war with the Islamic State. Each of these factors 
have been considerable obstacles to development and may explain why Iraq has 
developed slower than its oil-rich neighbors. While these factors are not the focus 
                                                          
85 Younis, Nussaibah and Sali Mahdy. "Iraq: The Fragile Economy of a Fragile State." Atlantic Council. 




of this chapter, it is important to recognize that corruption is not the sole problem 
that Iraq faces in terms of development.  
Self-interested vs. Strategic Elite 
Oil is the essence of the Iraqi economy. Around 60 percent of Iraq’s GDP is 
generated by oil and makes up around 90 percent of government revenues.86 While 
it makes intuitive sense to believe that having such a valuable resource would lead 
to higher economic growth and development, this is not necessarily the case for Iraq 
or developing countries in general. An abundance of natural resources can 
negatively influence development and economic growth.87 Since the 1980s, a large 
scholarly literature has suggested that an abundance of natural resources can 
actually lead to increases in the likelihood of negative economic, political, and social 
outcomes including poor economic performance, low levels of democracy, and civil 
war.88 In 1993 Richard Auty coined the term “resource curse” to describe the 
phenomenon in which resource rich countries do not benefit from favorable 
endowments and that they may actually perform worse than resource poor 
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countries.89 Academic theories about the mechanisms of the resource curse can be 
distinguished in three phases: first, since the 1970s the rentier state theory put forth 
by political scientist argues that resource sectors and resource rents negatively 
impact the capacity of the state; second, during the 1980s and 1990s, the theory of 
Dutch disease was widely used to explain how other economic sectors important for 
growth are crowded out by the natural resource sector; third, since 2000, several 
political economy models have been created, in the spirit of the rentier sate, 
exploring specific mechanisms that confirm that the process can be individually 
rational for actors.90 While the rentier state and Dutch disease theories are 
important to understand the impacts of natural resources, for the purposes of this 
work I will focus on how corrupt practices can lead to a resource curse.  
Natural resources generate extraordinary rents that tend to be concentrated 
in the hands of the political elite. These resource rents are more easily appropriated 
by the elite, especially if transparency and monitoring mechanisms are weak. Since 
resource rents are more easily appropriated than any other source of wealth, power 
struggles are more prevalent in resource rich countries as “…potential challengers 
have a stronger incentive to seek to replace the existing government by coup d’états, 
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or other forms of forced change in leadership.”91 In light of possible power struggles, 
members of the political elite are faced with the decision to either use resource rents 
for self-enrichment or for economic growth and development. The decision may 
depend on whether those in power are a self-interested or strategic elite.92 The self-
interested elite are more inclined to use resource rents to shore up political control. 
Patronage is one mechanism the political elite can use if the chances of losing power 
are high. A resource curse occurs when resource revenues are shifted away from 
productive activities into inefficient activities, like patronage, that would allow them 
to maintain power.93 This can be accomplished by buying votes or political support, 
increasing public sector employment and wages, or other valuable benefits to the 
public. The consequences of using patronage practices to stay in power is the 
inefficient allocation of public resources that reduce investments in developing 
human capital, the non-resource economy, and infrastructure.  
While a combination of high resource rents and a desire to stay in power 
under a self-interested elite may result in a resource curse, under a strategic elite 
resource rents may be more of a blessing. A strategic elite will be more inclined to 
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use resource wealth to please the public in order to stay in power longer.94 This is 
possible if resource rents are invested in productive activities, including the social 
provisioning of education, health, and housing. In this instance, resource rents help 
justify the rule of the elite by increasing living standards. While resource rents 
function similarly to help the self-interested and strategic elites maintain power, the 
strategic elite’s approach provides a benefit to society. 
Patronage and Development in Iraq 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, Iraq has had a long history of using 
corrupt patrimonial practices to consolidate and maintain power, including 
patronage. Iraq’s oil wealth has been the primary way in which past and current 
regimes have been able to hold on to power. During the Ba’ath regime, however, oil 
seemed to be less of a curse than it is today. The nationalization of the oil industry 
in 1972 and increase in oil revenues led to an accumulation of great wealth under 
the Ba’ath regime. While Saddam did appropriate this wealth to create and maintain 
patronage networks, he made development a priority because higher living 
standards would justify Ba’ath party rule.95 A sizeable portion of oil revenue was 
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invested in subsidized public services into the 1980s. As a result, “public health, 
education, drinking water and sanitation system were maintained at fairly high 
levels of quality, often by expatriate technical personnel.”96 Iraq’s healthcare and 
education systems were actually considered to be one of the most advanced in the 
region functioning at first world standards. The healthcare system was fully 
subsidized, high quality, and expanded to cover the majority of the population 
without discrimination.97 More than 250 hospitals were established, with an 
extensive network of primary healthcare facilities leading to dramatic improvements 
in health. Infant mortality rates fell from 117 per live births in 1960 to approximately 
40 by 1989 and life expectancy rose from 49 to 67 years.98 Similarly, Iraq’s education 
system was unique to the Middle East and was considered to be comparable to 
Western education. This was due, in part, to the ideology of the Ba’ath regime that 
emphasized the importance of education. The Ba’ath believed that through 
education individuals would awaken to the necessity of Arab unity.99 Between 1970 
and 1984 Iraq’s education system achieved a number of accomplishments unique to 
the Arab world, including gross enrollment rates close to 100 percent, the lowest 
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dropout rates in the Middle East and North Africa, and a decline in illiteracy to 10 
percent among the 15-45 age group.100 The Iran-Iraq war, Gulf war, and economic 
sanctions, however, wiped out most of Iraq’s progress in economic growth and 
development. There is no way to know for sure if improvements in development 
would have continued to be a part of the Ba’ath’s strategy, but Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait is a good indication that it would have continued to be used as a method to 
stay in power. Iraq’s reasoning for the Kuwait invasion was, at least in part, to 
increase oil reserves, production and revenue to continue development projects.101  
After the economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq, Ba’ath survival could no longer 
depend on pleasing the public through high standards of living, since resources were 
unavailable to do so. As the previous chapter illustrated, the Ba’ath regime exploited 
the UN Oil for Food Programme to pocket billions in kickbacks and surcharges, which 
supported domestic as well as international patronage networks to maintain 
power.102 During this desperate period, the regime shifted from a hybrid of self-
interested and strategic to a solely self-interested regime to hold on to power. 
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The post-Saddam political elite can be viewed as a self-interested elite. They 
have, for the most part, diverted oil rents away from development toward self-
enrichment or to maintain networks of support to stay in power. High volumes of oil 
revenue and weak transparency and accountability mechanisms have increased 
patronage practices by the political elite. While the Ba’ath regime did use patronage 
as a way to maintain power, it seems the use of this practice by the post-Saddam 
political elite has had a greater negative impact. Historically the control of Iraq’s oil 
wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few within the political elite. After the 
fall of the Ba’ath regime political dynamics in Iraq changed allowing for a large 
number of political groups to compete for oil wealth to maintain political control. As 
a result of this larger political elite, more groups are competing for rents and 
consequently stretching Iraq’s oil wealth thin. In order to access government coffers, 
Iraq’s political elite have designed creative ways to appropriate oil wealth. Legally, 
their schemes to appropriate revenue include mass employment, increasing the 
number of government ministries, and regulating party financing.103 The political 
elite also appropriate resources through illegal means, including contract rigging, 
ghost employment and double dipping, and oil smuggling.104 It is important to note 
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that while patronage that directly gives money to individuals in exchange for support 
is a form of corruption, patronage that legally provides public sector jobs or 
increases wages is not necessarily considered corrupt. It does, however, become a 
form of corruption when, in exchange for support, unqualified individuals are given 
jobs on the basis of religious or ethnic affiliation. The prominent use of this form of 
patronage has caused Iraq’s public sector to become extremely bloated and 
inefficient. Instead of inefficiently allocating resources to create public sector jobs 
or directly paying for support, oil rents could be channeled towards development 
projects that would benefit society as a whole rather than just the patron and his 
client.  
The actions of the self-interested Iraqi political elite can, at least in part, 
explain Iraq’s slow development after the fall of the Ba’ath regime. Oil rents are 
routinely diverted away from growth-producing activities towards activities that 
shore up political control. This has led to the neglect of much needed development 
in the aftermath of wars and crippling economic sanctions. Since development has 
largely been neglected by the self-interested elite, a number of problems that 
plagued the country in the decades prior to the overthrow of Saddam continue to 
this day, including the provision of public goods and Iraq’s crumbling infrastructure. 
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Electricity shortages have been a constant concern for Iraqis post-Saddam. 
Officials have claimed that $37 billion has been used to address power production 
in the country, yet the majority of Iraqis only get electricity for just five hours a 
day.105 Iraqis largely rely on private generators to meet electricity needs and 
consider the necessity of generators to be the ultimate mark of corruption in the 
energy sector given the government’s failure to provide power.106 Electricity 
shortages not only impact the Iraqi public, but also cost the Iraqi economy an 
estimated $40 billion a year by hampering industrial development.107 One factor that 
can explain the lack of improvements in electricity infrastructure is corruption in the 
Ministry of Electricity. In one case the Minister of Electricity, Raad Shalal, was forced 
to resign after he was accused of embezzling billions by signing contracts with a 
Canadian shell company and a German firm that had declared bankruptcy.108 In 
another case, officials arranged major contracts with General Electric and Siemens 
to construct large-scale generation plants that would be powered by natural gas, 
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even though Iraq did not have the gas necessary to fuel them, demonstrating the 
overall incompetence of those ministry officials.109  
Iraq’s water infrastructure is also largely neglected. For example, Iraq’s 
largest dam in Mosul has been neglected for years despite weak structural flaws. It 
is currently at risk of a catastrophic collapse that would send waves tens of feet tall. 
According to the US embassy in Iraq, “The approximately 500,000 to 1.47 million 
Iraqis residing along the Tigris River in areas at highest risk from the projected flood 
wave probably would not survive its impact unless they evacuated the flood zone. A 
majority of Baghdad’s 6 million residents also probably would be adversely 
affected— experiencing dislocation, increased health hazards, limited to no 
mobility, and losses of homes, buildings, and services”110 Only now, in the face of 
catastrophe has the Iraqi government approved a contract to repair and maintain 
the dam.111 
Iraqi’s drainage and sewer systems have also been largely neglected leading 
to deadly outcomes. In December 2012, Baghdad saw more than double the usual 
amount of rain, putting pressure on old and inadequate drainage systems. The 
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resulting floods caused buildings to collapse, killing several people. Officials blamed 
broken sewer pipes and the lack of funding to update the infrastructure.112 Similarly 
in 2015, outdated drainage systems were blamed for the death of fifty eight people 
by electrocution.113 Outdated drainage and water systems have led to poor 
sanitation and contaminated water. These outdated systems were blamed for the 
recent cholera outbreak in Iraq that spread through fifteen of eighteen 
governorates.114  
The overall state of healthcare in Iraq has not significantly improved post-
Saddam. Health ministry workers routinely steal drugs from hospitals to sell on the 
black market, millions of dollars meant for clinics and hospitals have gone missing, 
and millions more have been wasted on government contracts to buy expired 
medicines.115 The lack of decent public healthcare has caused many to turn to 
private clinics and in some cases the government will pay for Iraqis to travel abroad 
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to seek medical treatment rather than invest in improving the healthcare system.116 
Also, billions have disappeared on projects that have yet to be completed. In one 
case the Health ministry allocated an estimated 40 billion Iraqi dinars in 2013 to four 
projects that in 2015 still had completion rates of 0 percent.117 
Conclusion 
It is evident from the previous examples that corruption, at least in part, 
has contributed to Iraq’s slow development. This is demonstrated by the inefficient 
allocation of resource rents by a largely self-interested political elite. Resource 
rents are routinely appropriated to ensure the regime’s political survival. The 
desire to maintain power has caused the current political elite to shift resource 
rents from productive activities to unproductive activities, specifically patronage. 
Shifting resource rents to support the practice of patronage has led to poor 
development outcomes in post-Saddam Iraq. Living conditions in Iraq have not 
considerably improved since the overthrow of Saddam, despite substantial 
increases in oil revenue. While these living conditions were normal under Saddam, 
Iraqis reasonably expected better living standards after economic sanctions were 
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lifted. However, Iraq’s HDI, remains low relative to its oil-rich neighbors. Twenty-
three percent of Iraqis live below the national poverty line and unemployment is 
around eighteen percent.118 People are dying from inadequate medical care and 
preventable diseases. These are all circumstances one would expect from 
developing countries that lack wealth, not a country that earns billions of dollars in 
oil revenue a month. Expectations for better living standards have been thwarted, 
at least in part, by a self-interested political elite. 
  
                                                          




Combating Corruption in Iraq 
Underdevelopment and poor living standards have become characteristic of 
Iraq; however, in the past Iraq has demonstrated that it was capable of harnessing 
its oil wealth for development purposes, a strong indication that it is possible for 
Iraq to overcome the resource curse. Iraq was once one of the most prosperous 
and advanced countries in the Arab world during the 1970s and early 1980s. During 
this period, the Iraqi economy experienced a high growth rate of approximately 8.3 
percent making it the second largest economy in the Arab world, after Saudi 
Arabia, and the third largest economy in the Middle East.119 This was possible, in 
part, to the development efforts in the 1950s that laid the groundwork for future 
development initiatives.120 Initial efforts to raise the standard of living were made 
through projects in the fields of water storage, flood control, irrigation, drainage, 
industry, mining, and communications.121 Iraq was able to take on these initiatives 
due to increases in oil revenue, specifically during the oil price revolution of 1952. 
During this time, Iraq’s production increased from .091 million barrel per day 
(MBD) in 1949 to .697 MBD in 1955, increasing revenue from 31 million to 74 
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million Iraqi dinars, prompting the government to pursue a policy of channeling oil 
revenue for development purposes.122 Oil revenue would continue to play a 
substantial role in Iraq’s economic development, especially following the 
nationalization of the oil industry in 1972 and the oil price increase in 1973. The oil 
revenues that came with the price increase became an important part of 
cementing Ba’ath party rule. The party believed that raising living standards would 
pave the way for “further Ba’athification of the country by proving that the regime 
would deliver prosperity.”123 The 1970s marked the beginning of a period of 
unprecedented economic growth and high living standards in Iraqi history. “Using 
oil revenues, the government ploughed large amounts of money into providing 
free health care and education, expanding the country’s infrastructure, organizing 
large construction projects, and investing in industry and the military.”124 
Development, however, was short-lived and would deteriorate as Iraq entangled 
itself in two devastating wars. 
Since Iraq has had a history, although brief, of demonstrating the capability 
of using its oil wealth productively, it is reasonable to believe that it may be able to 
overcome the corrupting influences associated with the resource curse. A number 
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of approaches have been suggested, including instituting good governance 
initiatives based on accountability and transparency. Since the government 
controls oil revenue, an established set of rules and procedures should guarantee 
accountability and transparency of revenues through the system, which will allow 
the public to hold officials accountable for policies that lead to shared benefits of 
resources. These types of initiatives have been promoted as an important feature 
of anti-corruption frameworks by international organizations in developing 
countries, including Iraq.  
Good Governance Initiatives 
Academics and policy makers agree that political corruption is a major 
problem for many developing economies. International organizations have 
attempted to assist these states in addressing corruption problems. Since 
developing countries seem to be caught in a vicious cycle of corruption, 
international organizations can put pressure on governments to commit to the 
necessary reforms needed to remedy this problem.125 Good governance has 
become a prominent feature of international organizations’ anti-corruption 
initiatives to support growth in developing countries.  
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The good governance approach was adopted into mainstream development 
agendas of international organizations in the 1990s. The quality of governance was 
identified as key to ensuring better development performance after economic 
liberalization and structural adjustment policies in the decade prior led to poor 
results. The failure of economic liberalization and structural adjustments initiatives 
were blamed on poor quality governance, including weak governmental structures, 
administrative incompetence, corruption, lack of accountability and openness in 
policy making, and an absence of the rule of law.126 Since then, curbing corruption 
through improvements in governance quality has played a central role in initiatives 
to foster growth in developing countries by bilateral aid agencies, development 
banks, and prominent international organizations like the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
   While these organizations agree that good governance is key to 
combating corruption, their ideas of what constitutes good governance vary 
slightly with the mission of the organization. The IMF stresses the importance of 
rule of law and efficiency and accountability of the public sector. Through policy 
advice and technical assistance, the IMF focuses on improving the management of 
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public resources and supporting the development and maintenance of transparent 
and stable economic regulatory environments to eliminate opportunities for 
corruption.127 The UNDP has identified eight major characteristics of good 
governance that “assures corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are 
taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard 
in decision-making.”128 These characteristics describe good governance as 
participatory, transparent, responsive, consensus oriented, equitable and inclusive, 
effective and efficient, accountable, and follows the rule of law.129  World Bank 
standards emphasize that “Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, 
and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy 
imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for 
its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.”130 It identifies three mechanisms through which governance 
can be improved, including effective rules and restraints, greater competitive 
pressure, and increased citizen voice and partnership.131 These definitions share 
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important similarities; however, each organization concentrates on aspects that 
relate to its mission as an institution. The IMF focuses on improving economic 
environments, the UNDP emphasizes sustainable human development, and the 
World Bank focuses on economic and social resources for development.132 While 
these are just a few of the various definitions of what determines the quality of 
governance, the underlying theme of most definitions “emphasize the importance 
of a capable state, accountable to its citizens and operating under the rule of 
law.”133  
Principal-Agent vs. Collective Action Models 
While studies have found links between the quality of governance and 
development,134 good governance initiatives have been largely ineffective at 
combating corruption. Over the past thirty years, fewer than ten countries have 
been identified as success stories and countries that have achieved good 
governance were not among those that received the most international aid to 
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target corruption.135 There have been many criticisms of the good governance 
approach, but for the purpose of this work I will focus on what critics have argued 
to be a mischaracterization of the corruption problem.136 Good governance policies 
are grounded in the understanding of corruption as a principal-agent problem, 
therefore the initiatives to solve corruption are modeled around the implications 
of the principal-agent model. Given the failure of these initiatives, critics have 
argued that the collective action model has more to contribute to the 
understanding of corruption. While some critics argue that the collective action 
model may be better for conceptualizing corruption and therefore provide more 
effective strategies to solve corruption problems, others argue that both models 
are valuable for understanding corruption.   
The principal-agent theory of corruption has become influential in 
corruption literature in the fields of political science and economics and has 
consequently informed the views of policy makers. This theory was popularized by 
the work of economists Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Robert Klitgaard (1988) 
and is still widely used in research to understand corruption’s impact on economic 
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growth.137 Its dominance in research is evident in Ugar and Dasgupta’s (2011) 
review of the corruption and economic growth literature. They find that all 115 
studies included in their analysis “adhered to an explicitly-stated principal-agent 
approach to corruption, or their account was closely related to that approach.”138 
As the leading theory, it has shaped the perception of corruption’s impact on 
development and has largely informed policy of international organizations.  
A principal-agent problem arises when the principal (society) entrusts 
authority to an agent (public officials or political actors) to act on its behalf. Ideally 
agents are supposed to act in the best interest of the principal; however, this may 
not always be the case. The principal-agent model makes two assumptions: that 
the principal and agent have diverging interests and that the agent has more 
information than the principal resulting in information asymmetry between the 
two actors.139 Conflicts of interest may arise in this relationship, especially if the 
principal’s interests are costly to the agent, which may make the agent act in his 
own self-interest rather than the principal’s. Information asymmetry enables 
corrupt behavior because it is difficult for the principal to know if the agent is 
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acting in the principal’s best interest and it makes monitoring the agent’s behavior 
a challenge for the principal. In order to remedy corruption within the framework 
of this model, the agent’s incentives need to change; “…principals need to 
incrementally increase the negative pay-off for cheating and corruption (including 
the risk of being caught) to a point where the fear of being caught is higher than 
the greed that leads agents to engage in corruption.”140  
The implications from the principal-agent model have become the basis of 
international organizations’ current approach to anti-corruption reform. 
International organizations have sought to solve corruption through good 
governance initiatives that allow the principal to monitor the agent more 
effectively and change the level of discretion the agent has when making decisions. 
A wide range of formal mechanisms and institutions have been used, including 
monitoring mechanisms, increased transparency, checks and balances, democratic 
election mechanisms, free press, the establishment of independent anti-corruption 
agencies, wage increases for public officials, the strengthening of civil society, and 
independent court systems.141 While these mechanisms and institutions are 
beneficial for developing countries to have in place, they have been ineffective at 
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combating corruption. Critics of the principal-agent model blame policy failures on 
a mischaracterization of the problem.142  
Given the failure of the principal-agent model and good governance 
initiatives to solve corruption, academics have argued that corruption should 
instead be viewed as a collective action problem.143 It is important to note that the 
collective action model does not necessarily question the effectiveness of 
monitoring and punishment mechanisms, but questions the assumption that every 
society has a group of principled actors that are willing to enforce anti-corruption 
initiatives.144   
The collective action model gives more insight into the agent’s motivation 
on whether or not to engage in corrupt behavior. A collective action problem arises 
when, “even if it is in the best interest of all individuals in a group (or across 
groups) to act collectively towards a common goal, group members choose not do 
so; instead, group members find it in their individual interest to not contribute at 
all or to limit their contributions, ensuring that the collective benefit is not realized 
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to its fullest potential.”145 The underlying assumption in the collective action model 
is that agents are maximizers of their own self-interest.146 Therefore, in terms of 
corruption, individuals are better off acting against the group to engage in corrupt 
behavior and will choose to do so because there is incentive to defect no matter 
what everyone else chooses to do. Perceptions of other group members’ behavior 
also matter when individuals decide on whether or not to participate in corrupt 
activities. Persson et al. (2013) summarize the argument: 
In particular, the rewards of corruption—and hence the strategy any 
rational actor is most likely to opt for—should according to this set of 
theories be expected to depend critically on how many other individuals 
in the same society that are expected to be corrupt. Insofar as corrupt 
behavior is the expected behavior, everyone should be expected to act 
corruptly, including both the group of actors to whom the principal-agent 
framework refers to as “agents” and the group of actors referred to as 
“principals.”147 
 
Therefore, changing the corruption status quo requires concerted action by many, 
since decisions to engage in corruption is in part a consequence of how one 
observes the corrupt behavior of others.148 Actors may understand that there are 
gains to erasing corruption, but since they cannot trust that others will refrain from 
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corrupt practices, they have no incentive to refrain from corrupt practices 
themselves. Therefore, rather than just changing incentives it is important to 
change agents’ beliefs about what all the other agents are likely to do in when it 
comes to corrupt practices.149 This will require a more revolutionary change than 
what is suggested by the principal-agent model. Persson et al. (2010) find three 
conceptual pairs that would accomplish this revolutionary change, including 
shifting from particularistic to universalistic political culture, limited access orders 
to open access orders, and partiality to impartiality in the exercise of government 
power.150 Similarly Rothstein (2011) supports the idea of a revolutionary approach 
or what he calls the “indirect big bang approach.” Directly targeting corruption is 
not likely to “lead to change if it is not accompanied by an ‘indirect’ strategy in 
which many, if not most, other public institutions are changed from adhering to 
particularistic practices to universalism and impartiality.151  While there is a general 
consensus that institutional change is necessary, there has been surprisingly little 
focus on how this revolutionary change is to be accomplished. 
While some have argued definitively for either the principal-agent model or 
the collective action model, others have concluded that both models are valuable 
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for understanding corrupt behavior. These models “are not necessarily competing 
but are usefully complementary” as they emphasize different dynamics of the 
persistence of corruption.152 The principal-agent model’s approach to corruption is 
important because it highlights the rational choices that individuals make, while 
the collective action model provides additional insight useful for understanding an 
individual’s decision to participate in corrupt behavior within a group or society. 
Collectively they demonstrate that corruption persists not only because it is 
difficult to monitor and prosecute, but also because, when corruption is 
systemically pervasive, individuals lack the incentive to combat corruption.153   
Overcoming Corruption in Iraq  
Since the fall of the Ba’ath regime in 2003, international organizations, 
most notably the UNDP, have played an important role in guiding good governance 
initiatives. Iraq’s first significant step to combat corruption came in 2007 when it 
adopted the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption and with the support 
of the UNDP, developed its first comprehensive National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
for 2010-2014.154 This strategy is comprised of 200 action items designed to guide 
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Iraq’s anti-corruption institutions to prevent, deter, and counteract corruption. In 
addition to improving anti-corruption institution capabilities, the UNDP also assists 
Iraq through anti-corruption programs designed to increase transparency and 
accountability and works to empower civil society organizations by building their 
capacity to monitor and hold the government accountable for corruption. The IMF, 
through Stand-By Arrangements, has also provided technical assistance and aid to 
improve Iraq’s public financial management system by improving transparency and 
accountability of the mobilization of public resources.155 Iraq has also received 
assistance from non-profit organizations, like the Iraq Foundation, to “promote 
good governance, improve provincial government accountability and transparency, 
increase capacity of Iraq’s anti-corruption institutions at the provincial level, and 
strengthen civil society organizations’ capacity to conduct oversight activities.”156  
While these good governance initiatives are important for increasing 
transparency and accountability within the government, in Iraq’s case, they do not 
seem to be effective at combating corruption. Therefore, there is merit in 
examining corruption in Iraq through the lens of collective action given continued 
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difficulty with corruption, despite anti-corruption laws, strategies, and assistance 
from international organizations. As illustrated previously, these good governance 
initiatives are grounded in the idea that corruption can be challenged by allowing 
society to monitor political officials more effectively and by changing the level of 
discretion those officials have when making decisions. A more effective approach 
to combat corruption would also seek to understand a public official’s motivation 
and incentive within the context of society, since a decision to engage in corruption 
will depend on how that official views corruption in society. Once we have a grasp 
on motivations and how individuals understand corruption within society then we 
may be able to tailor initiatives that enable successful collective action against 
corruption in Iraq.  
Before international organizations can suggest any anti-corruption 
initiatives it is important that they understand the barriers that Iraq’s political elite 
face in acting collectively to fight corruption. The lack of political will is one of the 
greatest barriers facing Iraq’s ability to combat corruption. The involvement of the 
government is crucial to the success of any reforms as they hold the power to 
make changes happen. The Iraqi political elite may not want to join anti-corruption 
coalitions due to their proximity to the corruption scandals and because they 
benefit from the corrupt system. The lack of incentives and benefits to join a 
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collective coalition represents an additional barrier. As of today, incentives for 
joining a coalition to combat corruption would not compensate them as much as 
the ability to appropriate state resources. The most important incentive is the 
benefit from reducing corruption levels. This would allow for state resources to be 
channeled to improve overall well-being instead of unproductive activities. 
However, this may not be enough to convince the political elite if their focus is to 
enrich themselves rather than the nation. Perhaps the toughest barrier that the 
political elite need to overcome is their dominant use of patron-client 
relationships. The previous chapters highlighted how important patronage has 
been throughout Iraq’s history for political survival. An effort to rid Iraq’s political 
system of the kind of patronage that has been historically important to maintaining 
power will receive great pushback from nearly the entire political elite.      
While these barriers represent great challenges to Iraq’s anti-corruption 
effort, as of late there have been some promising developments with regards to 
increasing political will and challenging political patronage. Public demonstrations 
have taken place every Friday since the summer of 2015 against government 
corruption. The protests were initially sparked by electricity shortages in extreme 
heat, but evolved into calls for reforming the corrupt political system. Prime 
Minister Haidar al-Abadi tried to address the corruption by putting forth an 
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ambitious seven point plan designed to dismantle Baghdad’s top-heavy 
government.157 The plan included the elimination of a number of government 
posts, reduction in special benefits, and the disregard of sectarian quotas for senior 
positions. There were no promising developments as Abadi failed to issue practical 
instructions for implementation and reform opponents have subverted reform 
efforts.158  
As protests began to fizzle out, prominent Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr 
entered the fray demanding the government address corruption in a serious 
manner. In late March, Sadr was able to mobilize his followers to sit-in outside the 
walls of Baghdad’s Green Zone to press the government for real anti-corruption 
reforms. Sadr directly challenged Iraq’s power-sharing system and called on Abadi 
to replace cabinet ministers with non-party technocrats to tackle the political 
patronage that has fostered corruption.159 Non-party technocrats would get 
around the ethno-sectarian quota system dominant in Iraqi politics that has led to 
an inefficient and corrupt government. The mounting pressure seemed to have 
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worked as Prime Minister Abadi nominated a technocratic cabinet of which most 
have academic credentials and experience working in senior executive positions, 
managing, or administrating.160 The political elite, however, pushed back on the 
reform efforts as it would take away their hold on lucrative government ministries.  
On April 12, 2016 Abadi presented parliament with a second list of 
candidates with similar pushback on both the establishment and reformist sides 
since the list is a compromise of independent technocrats and party appointees. 
Parliament sessions have descended into chaos over the proposed cabinet and has 
led to calls for Iraq’s top political leadership to step down, including Prime Minister 
Abadi. On May 1, 2016, after parliament failed to pass Abadi’s second list of 
candidates, Sadr held a news conference where he essentially called for a major 
uprising of the Iraqi people. Shortly afterward protestors breached the heavily 
fortified Green Zone and stormed the parliament while security forces stood back 
and watched. Protestors only briefly occupied parliament, but it demonstrates the 
power that Sadr has among his followers. It also demonstrates that the Iraqi 
people have reached their breaking point. While the current political system is 
inclusive of Iraq’s major ethnic and religious groups, the benefits of this system 
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seem to end with the political elite. It is impossible to predict what this 
unprecedented development will lead to, but it seems that the current political 
system is no longer viable in the eyes of the Iraqi people.  
While the process of government reform has been slow and chaotic, it is a 
step in the right direction. There seems to be a reformist group within the 
government that genuinely wants to see change and their cause has become 
stronger after the Green Zone protests. If they can show that they are truly 
committed to ending corruption within the political system, this may signal to the 
rest of the political elite that the corrupt practices they have relied heavily upon to 
maintain power will no longer be acceptable. As illustrated above, in addition to 
changing incentives, it is also important to change public official’s beliefs about 
what others are likely to do when it comes to corrupt practices. Currently, the 
political elite know that almost everyone in the political system acts corruptly 
because corrupt behavior is expected behavior. If the current events can change 
these beliefs there may be hope for meaningful change. It is doubtful that 
corruption will completely cease, but it will at least no longer be seen as standard 
operating procedure. In addition to changing individual’s beliefs, there are a 
number of ways to overcome the barriers to the fight against corruption. Given 
that the current approach to corruption reform has been incredibly 
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confrontational, a non-confrontational approach may be more appropriate. When 
the political elite’s commitment to anti-corruption reform is limited, a direct 
confrontation may be counter-productive and undermine dialogue and real 
change.161 A non-confrontational approach may be more productive at engaging a 
previously uninterested elite. The reformist element within government can also 
convince the rest of the political elite through diverse and convincing incentives, 
including purposive incentives and the prestige of being a part of the movement 
that eliminated corruption.  
Conclusion 
It is not immediately clear what the solution is to Iraq’s corruption problem. 
It is clear, however, that good governance initiatives developed by international 
organizations are not enough to combat corruption. These initiatives assume that 
the public officials responsible for monitoring and oversight are willing to hold 
corrupt officials accountable, but if officials view corruption as the expected 
behavior in society then it is unlikely that these initiatives will be effective.162 In 
order to properly combat corruption, international organizations need to widen 
their views on how Iraq can overcome the barriers to acting collectively fight 
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corruption. International organizations’ efforts need to adjust to incorporate 
initiatives that create cooperation among the political elite to prevent and fight 
corruption. The success of any anti-corruption initiative will depend on the 
willingness of the political elite to refrain from corrupt practices. Since anti-
corruption initiatives require the involvement of the government, a lack of political 





This work has focused on understanding the extent of corruption in Iraq. It 
has demonstrated that the need to maintain political power has driven corruption 
throughout modern Iraqi history. Political regimes have been able to consolidate 
power by appropriating Iraq’s oil wealth to the detriment of state development. It 
also highlights the need to broaden the current understanding of corruption in Iraq 
in order to effectively resolve the problem. This work concludes at a critical 
moment in Iraqi history. The corrupt practices relied heavily upon by the Iraqi 
political elite are being directly challenged for the first time in history. Only time 
will tell if current efforts will result in meaningful change. In the meantime, this 
research can be used to understand why corruption has persisted overtime and 
how difficult it will be to overcome government corruption. 
This study has mainly focused on the differences between corruption of the 
Ba’ath regime and the political elite post-Saddam. While it is clear that corruption 
has increased under the current political elite, it is important to note that these 
differences can be attributed to the different political systems of each governing 
regime. The authoritarian nature of the Ba’ath regime meant that it could prevent 
corrupt practices through fear and violence. Also, since power was concentrated in 
the hands of the Ba’ath party, they solely decided how state resources would be 
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distributed, whether it be for development projects or to create patronage 
networks. On the other hand, the new political arrangement in Iraq has led to the 
distribution of power among three major communities all vying for their fair share 
of state resources. The lack of a strong central authority has made it more difficult 
to address corrupt practices, like patronage and nepotism. These practices could 
also be overlooked because they are important to maintaining power for the major 
groups in the power sharing arrangement. This study of corruption in Iraq has 
pointed to a broader issue, which is determining what political system is 
appropriate for Iraq’s fragmented society. How can we create a strong central 
authority that meets the needs of Iraq’s entire society, whether Shia, Sunni, or 
Kurd, without one group marginalizing the others? This may be key to ending 
power struggles and the corrupt practices that are used to consolidate power. In 
light of the unprecedented Green Zone protests, a more efficient political system is 
vital for Iraq moving forward.  
The research behind this thesis is limited by a few factors. First, there is 
very little prior research on the topic of corruption in Iraq. The lack of prior 
research meant that I could not build upon an existing theoretical framework, 
which required that I establish my own framework for understanding corruption in 
Iraq. Second, this research relies heavily on anecdotal data since corruption data is 
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limited. The lack of data limits the ability to gauge the impact of corruption and 
prove empirically that corruption has become worse post-Saddam. The secretive 
nature of corruption also restricts the ability to truly understand the extent of 
corruption. While we may know that corruption exists, we cannot be completely 
certain of its magnitude. It is difficult to obtain direct measures of corruption 
because individuals do not typically volunteer information on their illegal activities, 
since it can be costly to them. This is a problem that is common in most corruption 
research. These limitations should not discount this research as it has provided a 
general understanding of the extent of corruption in Iraq and offers a starting point 
for future research. 
Given the lack of research on corruption in Iraq, this work can act as a 
stepping stone for future studies. This work has examined government corruption 
more broadly than it would have if more research were available on Iraq. Future 
research could be more specific and focus on the extent of corruption in Iraq’s 
most lucrative ministries, including the oil, healthcare, and defense ministries. 
Potential research can also examine the benefits that corruption can provide. The 
absence of a properly functioning state may make the corrupt practices discussed 
throughout this research a necessary part of providing benefits and security to 
society. Future research may also examine whether it is appropriate or realistic to 
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impose Western notions of corruption on Iraq given its distinct political institutions 
and traditions. While these patrimonial practices are considered corrupt from a 
Western perspective, Iraqi society may not consider these practices to be 
completely illegitimate. Since little attention has been given to this research topic, 
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